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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

MICHAEL PROWS,

Plaintif-Appellant,

Case No.

16456

vs.
INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION OF UTAH,
BERGIN BRUNSWIG COMPANY, AND

ASSOCIATED INDEMNITY COMPANY,
Defendants-Respondents.

REPLY BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT

NATURE OF THE CASE
This is an action brought by the Plaintiff-Apellant to
obtain Workmen's Compensation benefits for injuries sustained
while at work.
DISPOSITION OF CASE BY INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION
Following an evidentiary hearing held on January 4, 1979,
the Industrial Commission denied any benefits to the PlaintiffAppellant on the basis that his injuries sustained during work
were not compensable Utah State law.
RELIEF ON APPEAL
Appellant seeks reversal of the Industrial commission's
order, and for an Order awarding him the benefits allowed by law.
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STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff-Appellant relies upon his rendition of the
facts stated in his earlier brief as supported by the factual
statement of the Defendant.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT HAS MISCONSTRUED THE
FACTS AND PRESENT LAW
In any legal forum, the parties thereto are bound to
disagree somewhat as to the facts and to inferences which can
be drawn from such facts.

However, Defendant has so stretched

the facts herein that Plaintiff-Appellant feels impelled to
reply to the most blatant misconstructions.
1.

In its brief, Defendant continuously refers to

Plaintiff-Appellant as the "aggressor" of the horseplay involvec
herein.
Such an assertion is mere wishful thinking.

Defendant

admits that Plaintiff-Appellant was performing his assigned
duties when he was attacked by two fellow employees (Defendants
Brief, pp. 3, 20).

Two fellow employees flipped elastic

at the Plaintiff-Appellant.

(R. at 19, 36).

bands

One of the two

"attackers" thereupon took an eighteen (18) inch piece of wood
d

and rushed the Plaintiff-Appellant in a playful manner, pretenJ
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the stick was a sword.

(R. at 19).

In self defense, Plaintiff-

Appellant grabbed the stick out of the fellow employees grasp.
Plaintiff thereupon took one of the elastics and the.wooden
stick and attempted to flip the stick away "into the air".
(R.

at 30) .

The full cycle of the foregoing events probably

took less than thirty (30) seconds.

Nevertheless, Defendant

argues that although attacked by fellow employees, although
using only those items by which he was attacked, and although
he only tried to flip those items away, somehow that chain of
events transformed Plaintiff-Appellant into the "aggressor"
and out of the realm of compensation benefits.
Such logic is an attempt to distort the facts from
what really happened
engaged in his work.

Plaintiff-Appellant was attacked while
In an attempt to flip away the sword and

rubber band by which he had been attacked, he was injured.

Such

an injury, as described by earlier cases of this court, is clearly
within the bounds of compensability.
2.

Defendant asserts that Plaintiff-Appellant has not

only failed to specify alleged errors in the Administrative
Law Judge's Findings, conclusions, and Order, but that
Plaintiff-Appellant has somehow waived such objectives.
Aside from the fact that the Industrial Commission
itself admitted in its Order Denying Review that the Findings,
Conclusions, and Order were "not correct"

(R. at 97),

Plaintiff-

Appellant very exhaustively treated each such error in his
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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"Motion for Review of Order"

(R. at 89).

Such Motion was not

only strenuously made in the lower forum but is included as part
of the record on appeal.
It seems rather incongruous to argue that even though
the Industrial Commission admitted the errors, PlaintiffAppellant has now waived them on appeal despite his reference
to such admission and his reference to the record wherein he
more adequately corrected the errors
The reference to the medical panel report is only
indicative of the amount of care taken in the preparation of the
Findings, Conclusions, and Order by the Administrative Law Judge,
3.

Defendant's analysis of the landmark case of Twin

Peaks Canning co., et al v. Industrial Commission of Utah, 57
Utah 589, 196, Pac. 853 20 A.L.R. 872 (1921)

is also misleadi~.

Defendant asserts that the injury therein occured during activitis
of work.

However, the injury occurred at a time when the

"aggressor" had completely abandonedhis work.

As stated by

the court:
"Neither the deceased nor Mitchell was
required to perform any duties whatever
on the second floor, nor was either
required to go there for any purpose."
196 P. at 854
The court also stated:
"The accident thus occured as the result
of what in the books is ordinarily
denominated as practical joking, horseplay,
or pranks." 196 P. at 855.
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Despite Defendant's attempts to distinguish Twin Peaks
from the present situation, despite Defendant's attempts to minimize
the case's significance because of its age, despite Defendant's
attempts to argue that the law should be different. today than
it was earlier, and despite Defendant's reference to the case law
of other states and philosopichal treatises on theoretical
propositions for Workmen's Compensation benefits, the law in Utah
is still the same and Twin Peaks is totally on point.
To assert that Workman's Compensation benefits should
be denied to Plaintiff herein who was attacked while working
but to allege that the aggressor-deceased in Twin Peaks was
properly awarded compensation lacks inconsistency at best.
Furthermore, Defendant assails Plaintiff's citation of older cases
but does

not hesitate to refer itself to the Commercial Casualty

case (1928), the Sullivan case (1932) , the Pacific Employers case
(1936) the Horn case (1940), etc.
that the age of the case, although

Plaintiff-Appellant asserts
noteworthy, does not make

the legal arguments therein obsolete, particularly when they have
not been overturned.

The Twin Peaks case has been specifically

reaffirmed several times since its decision.

See e.g. M & K

Corporation v. Industrial Commission, 112 Utah 488, 189 P.2d 132
(Utah 1948).
4.

Defendant's reference to case law of other states

(as well as Plaintiff-Appellant's reference to such cases) must
be v iewed
·

with guarded caution.

·
The statutory prerequisites in

other statesSponsored
often
differ
fromFunding
that
of provided
the byState
Utah.
Even
by the S.J.
Quinney Law Library.
for digitization
the Institute ofof
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...
as discussed in Twin Peaks:
"In most of the states the statutes
cover accidents 'arising out of and
in the course of employment,' whITe
our statute [cite omitted) covers all
accidents 'arising out of or in the
course of employment.' . • ~. It is
important to keep the distinction in
mind when the compensation cases from
the various jurisdictions are considered."
196 P. at 856.
(Emphasis added)
Thus, al though interesting to note how other jurisdictions may have handled workmen's compensation claims, such
decisions may be entirely inappropriate to Utah law for the
reasons observed in Twin Peaks.

Plaintiff-Appellant submits

that the Utah case law is clear on the subject of accidents
involving horseplay, and that what Defendant is really suggesting to this Court is that it overule nearly sixty years of
precedent and to adopt the position of some other states whose
statutory prerequisite are different than our own.
5.

Defendant, in its brief, proposes this Court adopt

the standard for "horseplay" cases proposed by Professor
Arthur Larson in his treatise "Workmen's Compensation Law"·

Even if the Court were to adopt such a standard, the Plaintiff.

Appellant's injury would still fall within the bounds of compei
sation.

Applying Professor Larson's test, the injury would

have occurred as follows:

A.

The extent and Seriousness of the Deviation.

The

Plaintiff-Appellant was engaged in his work at the time of the
playful "attack" by his fellow employees.

His only "deviation

from that work was the normal response of self-defense to the
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attack and in flipping away the objects which were directed
towards him.

Such a brief "deviation" from employment hardly

qualifies as a serious departure from his assigned duties as
to deny him Workmen's Compensation benefits.
Completeness of the Deviation.

B.

Plaintiff-Appellant

has admitted that flipping rubber bands was not part of his
assigned duties.

As a result Defendant.asserts Plaintiff-

Appellant has admitted a complete abandonment of his work.
Such is not the case.

The "tools" of the horseplay were

objects the employees worked with and provided by the employer;
the horseplay itself was a normal occurrence at the warehouse, and the thirty-second deviation from work in the wake
of an "attack" by fellow employees is hardly substantial
under the circumstances.

In retrospect, Plaintiff-Appellant

can hardly imagine what more he could have done under the
circumstances to merit compensation.

Should he have ignored

the flying rubber bands and sword attack or was he justified
in defending himself and in shooting away the sword and rubber
bands?
The Extent to ·which the Practice of Horseplay Had

C.

Become an Accepted Part of Employment.
Despite Defendant's attempts to minimize the frequency
of the rubber band fights, those who participated therein
testified they occurred from "once a day or twice even" to
"constantly"

(R. at 22, 36).

The supervisor testified he

was not aware of their occurrence as frequently as that, but
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was aware of their occurrence (R. at 46-48) .

An emp l oyer 1 s ig.

norance of an activity is not proof that it doesn't exist.
Furthermore, the employer is charged with constructive
knowledge that boys of youthful age are often involved in horseplay.

As stated in Twin Peaks:
. "Every employer understands that, in
case boys of immature years are employed,
he is charged with notice of their natural
propensities to congregate, to communicate,
and to play with one another." 196 P. at
858.
Although Defendant argues that a boy of twenty-one

years of age is no longer a boy, but a man of maturity and
wisdom, Plaintiff-Appellant submits that there is no magic
age at which one acquires those attributes and instantaneously
casts aside his "natural propensities" for fun.

The issue

~

this regard is one of degree, not whether he still retains
all such propensities or has outgrown them all .

. D.

The Extent to Which the Nature of the Employment

May be Expected to Include Some Such Horseplay.
Defendant argues in this respect that it was unforseeable to the employer that its employees "would flip elasti~
or other projectiles at each other".

(Defendant's Brief, P· 11:

This inconsistent statement follows just two pages in Defendant'
brief from the readmission that the employment supervisor had
"observed the elastic flipping" on several occasions.

(Defe~

dant's Brief, p. 15).
Thus, not only was such activity "foreseeable", the
supervisor had specific knowledge that such activities existed.
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sf

Defendant quotes Professor Larson's hypothetical
about young boys being hired to pick tomatoes and asserts
that the employer should know that before long a tomatoe
will be thrown.
Plaintiff-Appellant submits that playing young boys
(or men as Defendant prefers to call them) in an environment
of boxes held together by many rubber bands, that the employer
should normally expect rubber band fights.

Indeed, this case

bears that expectation out.
CONCLUSION
The Workmen's Compensation statutes were enacted to
lLmit the employers' liability towards multifarious employee
lawsuits and to provide to employees a system of benefits
for work-related injuries.

To deny Plaintiff-Appellant such

benefits in this case would not only be contrary to existing
precedent but would contravene the policy of workmen's compensation laws itself.

.,..

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

_jJ__

day of January, 1980.

Bruce J. Nelson
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4th Floor Newhouse Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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